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Abstract
This papers sheds light on the puzzling evidence that even though
open source software (OSS) is a public good, it is developed for free
by highly qualiﬁed, young and motivated individuals, and evolves at a
rapid pace. We show that once OSS development is understood as the
private provision of a public good, these features emerge quite nat-
urally. We adapt a dynamic private-provision-of-public-goods model
to reﬂect key aspects of the OSS phenomenon. In particular, instead
of relying on extrinsic motives for programmers (e.g. signaling) the
present model is driven by intrinsic motives of OSS programmers, such
as user-programmers, play value or homo ludens payoﬀ, and gift cul-
ture beneﬁts. Such intrinsic motives feature extensively in the wider
OSS literature and contribute new insights to the economic analysis.
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attrition.
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11 Introduction
With the success of famous open source software (OSS) products like the
operating system ‘Linux’, the ‘Apache’ Web Server’ or the web browser
‘Mozilla’, the open source movement has attracted the interest of economists;
e.g. Johnson (2002), Lerner and Tirol (2002), Myatt and Wallace (2002), Mu-
stonen (2003) and Von Krogh and von Hippel (2003). What often puzzles
economists dealing with this topic is the fact that OSS – a public good1 –
is developed for free by highly educated volunteer programmers and at a
speed of innovation that in some respects outpaces commercial software de-
velopment. Yet, in general, economics would predict that privately provided
public goods suﬀer from problems of under-provision, delays in supply, and
inferior quality.
This puzzle appeared to have been solved – at least for economists – by
the work of Lerner and Tirole (2002). In their paper, entitled ‘Some Simple
Economics of Open Source’, the fundamental question of why someone would
want to contribute, without pay, to the development of OSS is answered by
appealing to the concept of signaling. They suggest that it is the signalling of
a hacker’s programming ability which serves as the key driving force behind
the voluntary commitment of OSS programmers.
However, recent ﬁndings indicate that this answer might fall short of cap-
turing all aspects of the OSS phenomenon. For example, empirical studies on
1OSS is a public good since it features non-rivalry in consumption (a characteristic
embedded in most non-material goods) and non-excludability. The latter feature is ensured
by distribution of OSS under the Free Software Foundation (FSF) GNU, GPL, or GNU
LGPL licenses, which ensure that the source code of software can be copied, modiﬁed,
distributed freely and that – most importantly – all derived work has to be under the same
open source license (FSF (2004)). See separate appendix B (not intended for publication).
2the motivation of OSS programmers, e.g. Hertel et al. (2003) and Lakhani
and Wolf (2003), do not support the signaling hypothesis. Instead, both
Hertel et al. (2003) and Lakhani and Wolf (2003) ﬁnd that intrinsic motives
are the most important reason for programmer’s enthusiastic commitment to
OSS projects.2 Even more problematic for the signaling hypothesis is that
previous empirical and theoretical research focuses exclusively on those OSS
projects which are prestigious, visible and/or have survived for some time.
Inevitably, such projects are prone to foster extrinsic motives (such as signal-
ing value); furthermore, following Frey (1997, 2002), monetary incentives (i.e.
extrinsic motivation) will crowd out intrinsic motivation.3 In contrast, the
majority of OSS projects have emerged from un-sensational, un-prestigious
and humble software problems4, while only a few have become widely used
and thus well known. In such environments signaling can hardly be a key
driving force – all the more so as there exist literally tens of thousands of
unknown and therefore un-prestigious OSS projects that are developed and
maintained by an army of volunteers with the same vigour and intensity
as their famous counterparts. Why would an individual ever consider con-
tributing to such a project? To illustrate, the SourceForge.net repository of
OSS projects, on its own, hosts 86,873 OSS projects with 910,899 registered
contributors.5 The majority of these OSS projects are, of course, utterly
unknown to the wider public. Taking into account the small expected value
2Note that intrinsic motives may also be an important parameter in commercial soft-
ware development, see Trittmann et al. (2002).
3For further reading on the relation of intrinsic and extrinsic motives see the recent
book by Frey and Osterloh (2002).
4A rare exception to this rule is software released as OSS after initially being developed
as commercial software, e.g. StarOﬃce (OSS version: OpenOﬃce) and Netscape (OSS
version: Mozilla).
5Data from September 2004. In comparison, the FSF hosts some 2,600 OSS projects.
3of beneﬁts from extrinsic motives that such projects can command, it be-
comes questionable if the phenomenon OSS, or at least the phenomenon of
programmers starting up OSS projects, can at all be rationalised by extrinsic
motives. Thus, the economics of OSS may not be that simple after all.
The present paper investigates this issue. The motives of participants of
OSS start-up projects or projects with low visibility, i.e. motives that cannot
be reduced to simple signaling, have to the best of our knowledge not yet been
dealt with in economic analysis of the OSS phenomenon. To understand the
roots of the OSS phenomenon, the motives and characteristics of initiators
of OSS projects have to be analysed and understood. Reviewing the rapidly
emerging literature on OSS, we identify three crucial themes that that reg-
ularly appear when analysing the motivation of OSS programmers and in
particular initiators: (a) the need for a particular software solution, i.e. the
phenomenon of user-programmers, (b) the fun to play, i.e. some form of homo
ludens payoﬀ, and (c) the desire to give a gift to the programmer community,
i.e a gift beneﬁt. In particular the latter two motives are greatly underrated
in economics – with some notable exceptions (Frey, 1997, 2002, Lindenberg,
2001) – yet are frequently discussed in other branches of the social sciences.
Once incorporated into a traditional private-provision-of-public-goods eco-
nomic framework, these motives yield important new insights.6
The private-provision-of-public-goods model we propose for the study of
the OSS phenomenon follows the tradition of Bliss and Nalebuﬀ (1984), Hen-
dricks et al. (1988) and Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996). The private provision
6Other papers that model OSS in private-provision-of-public-goods frameworks, but
do rely on more traditional economic rewards, are e.g. Johnson (2002) and Myatt and
Wallace (2002). Motives such as gift beneﬁt and homo ludens payoﬀ are included in the
OSS accounts of e.g. Zeitlyn (2003), Torvalds and Diamond (2001), Raymond (2000a,
2000b). See also section 2.
4of OSS is modelled as a continuous time n player war of attrition. By includ-
ing the motives of user-programmers, a homo ludens payoﬀ, and a gift beneﬁt,
this model allows us to determine the characteristics of the provider of the
OSS. It is found that software is provided sooner rather than later. Thus, in
contrast to other applications of the war of attrition (e.g. Alesina and Drazen,
1991), the present model features no rational delay. More importantly, as to
the contributing individual: ceteris paribus an OSS programming individual
is characterised by a higher gain from using the OSS software solution, a
larger value adjoint to the gift beneﬁt, a longer time horizon (i.e. a younger
individual), more patience, higher eﬃciency (lower development cost), and a
high homo ludens payoﬀ, i.e. the value derived from playing with the soft-
ware and mastering the challenge. These model results correspond well to
the picture of OSS developers that has emerged from empirical studies.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the OSS phe-
nomenon, provides an introduction to the literature on OSS, and relates
our paper to this context. Section 3 introduces the formal model. In Sec-
tion 4 we derive the equilibria and characterise the agents who develop OSS.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 OSS: Features and Motives
There have been a number of papers dealing with the motivation of program-
mers and examining why they are willing to program OSS. Raymond (2000a,
2000b), Lerner and Tirole (2002), Torvalds and Diamond (2001) carried out
case-study-based analysis, focussing on famous OSS projects like the Apache
Web Server, Perl, and sendmail. Empirical studies based on the analysis of
web archives are those of Hertel et al. (2003), who dealt with Linux, and
5Lakhani and Wolf (2003), Krishnamuturthy (2002), and Hars and Ou (2002)
who were concerned with a broad range of diﬀerent OSS projects.
In the studies mentioned, two general groups of motives are identiﬁed:
intrinsic and extrinsic motives. While intrinsic motivation describes the cir-
cumstance that somebody is doing something because it is inherently inter-
esting, enjoyable or challenging, in the case of extrinsic motivation, someone
expects a separable outcome (Deci and Ryan, 1985, Ryan and Deci 2000).
Furthermore, the empirical studies show that the ‘average’ OSS contrib-
utor is about 30 years old and well-educated. Hars and Ou (2002), for ex-
ample, ﬁnd 54 percent of the contributors in their sample to be less than
29 years of age and 72 percent have a bachelor’s, master’s or Ph.D. degree.
Similar results are found by Hertel et al. (2003), Lakhani and Wolf (2003),
Krishnamuturthy (2002).
A central aim of the present paper is to understand the economic eﬀect of
the motives of those agents who are willing to provide the initial public good
OSS, and to characterise these agents within a formal economic framework.
As argued in the introduction, the present paper goes beyond the simple
economic motives associated with signaling. In particular, since program-
ming software is associated with the risk of failure (e.g. the software is not
technologically successful or the project does not become famous) extrinsic
motives (signalling) are unable to explain the OSS phenomenon in its full,
and can rarely be linked to the motives of initiators of OSS projects.
Hence, apart from extrinsic motives associated with signalling value, there
remain three main motives that are frequently discussed as explanations for
why an initiator starts an OSS project:
• need for a particular software solution
• fun/play, i.e. a homo ludens payoﬀ
6• gift culture, social standing
The motivation of a single programmer for starting an OSS project is of
course a mixture of these reasons.
Founders usually start a project because they are not satisﬁed with ex-
isting software or simply because the required software does not exist. For
example Linus Torvalds needed a Unix for his PC, resulting in Linux (Tor-
valds and Diamond, 2001), Eric Allman needed a more eﬃcient email server
resulting in ‘Sendmail’, Larry Wall needed a tool to automatically generate
web pages resulting in ‘Perl’, and ﬁnally Don Knuth needed a convenient
tool for type-setting documents resulting in ‘TEX’ (Knuth, 1979).
Thus, the programmer beneﬁts directly from developing the software,
further famous examples in that category being KDE, XFree86, The Gimp,
Emacs. The need for a particular software solution can be seen as a necessary
but not suﬃcient condition for the start of an OSS project – in particular
it cannot explain the decision to make one’s programming results available
publicly and for free. This is where other intrinsic motives play a crucial
role for an initiator starting up an OSS project. Thus, besides mentioning
the need for a new software, important contributors to the development of
OSS claim that they are doing the programming ‘just for fun’ (Torvalds and
Diamond (2001)). Programming is a leisure-time activity, i.e. playing around
with the possibilities of software or mastering the challenge as a pastime. This
idea – that the fun of play is an important motivation for humans – is not
new and can be traced back to Plato; the locus classicus is Johan Huizinga
(1938). Huizinga’s homo ludens, the playful human, means in our setting
that the programmer receives some form of beneﬁt simply from carrying out
the programming or rather from mastering a software problem. Raymond
even goes a step further and argues that the intrinsic interest in the software
7leads to better quality programming. He states:
“It may well turn out that one of the most important eﬀects of
open source’s success will be to teach us that play is the most
economically eﬃcient mode of creative work.”
(Raymond, 2000b, chapter 11)
The fun of play thus appears to be another necessary condition for starting
an OSS project, but like the motive ‘need for a new software’, it is not
suﬃcient. There are thousands of programmers who program new software
because they need it and have fun programming it, but these programmers
decide to earn money with the ﬁnal product or are not willing to publish
the source codes, but rather keep them as private software solutions. Thus,
what is the motive to turn one’s eﬀorts into a public good, namely publish
the source code of one’s programm and have it licensed under the GPL?
There are a host of candidate motives, and the literature is far from
settled on the issue. Although the various explanations diﬀer, all of them
carry the common theme of ‘giving one’s program as a gift to the community’.
We summarise such motives under the term ‘gift culture’ (Schmied, 1996;
Berking, 1996; Zeitlyn, 2003).
One of the motives falling into this category is the desire to gain a reputa-
tion within the hacker community. The names of the ‘patrons’ are distributed
with the source code of their piece of software, which includes a list (e.g. the
update log) of all contributors to the project. In this way, the individual’s
acceptance within the community is boosted, and with it her reputation and
social status. Thus, the ‘social status’ of a programmer in this community is
determined by the ‘gift’ which she has given to it (Raymond 2000a, chapters
6-8). Another motive is what Hars and Ou (2002) call ‘community identiﬁca-
8tion’. By this they mean that programmers see the open source community
as a family which works towards a convergence between their individual goals
and the goals of the community. Members see the community as kin and are
therefore willing to do something which might be beneﬁcial to the commu-
nity even if it is not for themselves. Of course, ‘membership’ in the OSS
community entails some kind of obligation for the individual programmer to
follow the rules of the community, i.e. to publish the source code of his soft-
ware. Although this is not obvious, Lindenberg (2001) shows that obligations
can be considered as intrinsic motives, arguing that if people act based on a
principle, they do not pursue external rewards. Another branch of the obli-
gation hypothesis can be regarded as ‘reciprocal altruism’ in the sense that
the volunteers who invest their eﬀorts carry a belief that other programmers
investing eﬀorts into related problems will also make the resulting solution
publicly available. Finally, pure altruism must also be mentioned as an im-
portant motive to publish the source code of one’s software. For example,
Richard Stallman (1999) sees OSS as a social movement promoting computer
users’ right to use, study, copy, modify, and redistribute computer programs
as part of fundamental democratic principles.7 Publishing the source code of
one’s software is often based on the wish to support this movement.
It is noteworthy that such explanations of gift culture are only feasible
due to the freely available information within the community of develop-
ers. This close-to-costless information is a crucial characteristic of the open
source development process. Information about new or ongoing projects are
compiled on websites and in news groups.
7Cf. www.fsf.org for more information.
93 The Model
Consider a population N of individuals j. Each individual has the ability to
develop one discrete unit of OSS, which is identical for all individuals, and
consumption of which is characterised by non-rivalry and non-excludability.8
Thus, the software is a public good and, once developed, it exists forever.
Time is continuous and individuals discount the future at rate rj. Utility
ﬂows are as follows. Without the OSS, individuals have to live with a com-
mercial proprietary software alternative and receive the utility ﬂow vj. From
the time of introduction of the OSS, all individuals obtain the ﬂow utility
uj = vj + zj, where zj ≥ 0 for all j = 1,...,N is the ﬂow value of the OSS
becoming available. Individuals can produce the software at net cost Cj (to
be speciﬁed below), which is the discounted present value of the net costs to
individual j performing the development, i.e. it is the actual development
cost minus any gains from the gift given to the community and the play
value of performing the programming (homo ludens payoﬀ). Given these
speciﬁcations we can state:
Lemma 1. No individual of the group m, deﬁned by Cj ≥
zj
rj for all j =
1,...,m, would ever develop the OSS. The community of potential developers
consists of n = N − m individuals.
According to lemma 1 the community of potential developers is charac-
terised by Ci <
zi
ri for all i = 1,...,n. Stated diﬀerently, lemma 1 says that
those with low costs of development and those with much to gain from the
OSS – or alternatively, those with a great deal of disutility from having to
8Even though one may think of a complete piece of software, the actual OSS pro-
gramming process consists rather of contributing to the pool of OSS by programming an
enhancement or a new module to an ongoing OSS project.
10live with the commercial software alternative – are members of the commu-
nity, i.e. potential software developers. This ﬁts well with the observations
in Section 2. Assume that within this group n (the community) all costs and
beneﬁts are common knowledge. If we model a simultaneous one-time choice
from the strategy set {develop,do not develop}, then this game becomes a
static game of chicken, where the winning agents free-ride and have payoﬀ
ui
ri
and the losing agent develops the software and has payoﬀ
ui
ri − Ci. If no one
develops, the payoﬀ for everyone is
vi
ri. As usual, this kind of game features
a host of pure and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in which anyone might be
the current developer of the software.9
By allowing individuals to postpone their decision for some time, for
example to wait and see if someone else is developing the software, we can
introduce important dynamics into the game. Obviously the length of time
a member of the community n is willing to wait depends on her beneﬁt from
the existence of the OSS, the cost of developing the software herself, and her
time preference. In the normal-form version of this game, a pure strategy is
a time ti ∈ [0,∞) where i will develop if no one else already has done so.
We can state the following payoﬀs. If the OSS is developed by individual












If individual i is the actual developer of the software, she suﬀers a one-time
development cost ci, but receives a one-time play value pi and a net utility
ﬂow gi incurred for ∆ periods. The term gi denotes the gift beneﬁt. The total
9If all except for individual i choose do not develop, then it is optimal for i to choose
develop, since ui
ri − Ci > vi
ri (lemma 1). And, if i chooses develop then it is optimal for
the n−1 other agents to choose do not develop. This reasoning holds for any agent of the
community n.
11net cost for agent i of voluntarily developing the software at time t can thus be





. Assuming that ∆
extends to inﬁnity, then via lemma 1 we know that ui + gi + ri(pi − ci) > vi.
Thus every individual in the community n would rather develop in period 0
than live without the OSS forever. Now, if individual i develops the software
at time t her payoﬀ is







+ (pi − ci)e
−rit (2)
Finally, if no one ever develops the software, individual i has payoﬀ
Ri =
vi
ri = limt→∞Fi(t) = limt→∞Di(t).
Any individual i such that ci < pi +
gi
ri will develop voluntarily and
immediately at time t = 0. The condition pi +
gi
ri > ci implies Di(t) > Fi(t)
for all t. Since Di(t) is monotone and falling in t, Di(0) maximises utility.
Put diﬀerently, an individual with a high homo ludens payoﬀ and/or a high
gift beneﬁt simply develops the software, rather than waiting for someone
else to provide it.10 If such an individual exists, the game ends at time
t = 0, and the OSS is developed immediately, i.e. at maximum speed. The
more complex game emerges under the assumption that ci ≥ pi +
gi
ri for all
i = 1,...,n. Given this assumption and lemma 1 we have Fi(t) > Di(t) > Ri
for all t and the game becomes an n player war of attrition.
10Implicitly we assume that several agents can develop the software, but only one unit of
software is created. However, all developing agents get their homo ludens and gift beneﬁt
payoﬀ.
124 Results
In the remainder of this paper we employ the assumption that ci ≥ pi +
gi
ri
for all i = 1,...,n. One can characterise the following equilibria for this type
of game.
Lemma 2. For every individual i there is a subgame perfect equilibrium
outcome in which only i will develop immediately.
Proof (Sketch). If no one else but i develops, then i’s best strategy is
to develop immediately, and if i develops immediately, everyone else’s best
strategy is to wait.
Thus the game permits – as is usual for this type of game – many subgame
perfect equilibria in which anyone might volunteer. However, the set of
subgame perfect equilibria can be radically reduced once time is ﬁnite.11
With this assumption we are able to fully characterise the individual that
will actually provide the public good.
Let Ti denote individual i’s ﬁnite time horizon, e.g. marking the fact
that i is a ﬁnitely lived agent, or stating a point in time at which i changes
into a diﬀerent job (where she is unable to expend eﬀort on open source
programming), or a point in time when i’s human capital is outdated. Then































The eﬀect of a ﬁnite time horizon is that the game becomes non-
stationary. Thus from an agent’s perspective, there is a point in time ¯ t
11See also the results in Hendricks et al. (1988) and Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996).
13where she will no longer choose to enter as a developer of OSS. Beyond that
point in time, even when the software is not provided, a dominant strategy is
to not develop at all, i.e. Di(t) < Ri ∀ t > ¯ ti. Solving for Di(¯ t) = Ri deﬁnes
this point in time.
Lemma 3. Individual i will not develop the OSS after time






zi + gi + ri(pi − ci)

. (6)
Notice that limpi→ci ¯ ti = Ti, which means that when the play value ap-
proaches the cost of development, then an individual will always want to
develop the software, even in the period in which she is leaving the game.12
Also, if zi+gi < ri(ci−pi), then time ¯ t is not deﬁned, which is in fact the con-
dition of lemma 1, i.e. individuals that are not members of the community
n. Using lemma 3 it is possible to state:
Proposition 1. Given a ﬁnite time horizon for every individual in the com-
munity n and assuming that for all j = 1,...,n : ¯ tj 6= ¯ ti ∀ i = 1...n;i 6= j,
there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which the individual with
the highest ¯ ti volunteers at time t = 0.
Proof. Relabelling individuals, the diﬀerent ¯ ti’s can be ordered ¯ tn > ¯ tn−1 >
... > ¯ t1. When no one has provided the software until time t ∈ (¯ tn−1,¯ tn],
agent n knows that no one else will ever develop the OSS. Since Dn(t) >
Rn(Tn) ∀ t ∈ (0,¯ tn) and hence also for all t ∈ (¯ tn−1,¯ tn), agent n’s subgame
perfect strategy is to develop the OSS if any time t ∈ (¯ tn−1,¯ tn) is reached.
Similarly at any time t ∈ (¯ tn−2,¯ tn−1] agents n and n−1 are the last potential
12Notice also that when assumption ci ≥ pi +
gi
ri ∀ i = 1,...,n, i.e. the war of attrition
assumption, is violated, then
zi+gi
zi+gi+ri(pi−ci) < 1 and hence ¯ ti > Ti, i.e. these individuals
gain no utility from waiting.
14candidates to provide the software. But there is a time ˜ t < ¯ tn−1 and suﬃ-
ciently close to ¯ tn−1, such that Fn−1(¯ tn−1) > Dn−1(˜ t), therefore n − 1, and
everyone else, will prefer to wait for n to volunteer at time ¯ tn−1. Hence, in
any subgame perfect equilibrium, n will volunteer at some time t ∈ (˜ t,¯ tn].
By backwards induction, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium has n de-
veloping the OSS at t = 0.
The intuition for this proposition is straightforward. If you know that
you are the one with the highest beneﬁt/cost ratio of developing the OSS,
and if you know that everyone else knows this as well, then you might as
well give in right away. Thus, even though we allow individuals to wait, the
war of attrition with full information features no rational delay. Software is
developed sooner rather than later. The individual actually developing the
software is characterised by the highest ¯ t. Proposition 1 opens the possibility
of obtaining a complete characterisation of the OSS programming individual
that can be matched and compared to the accounts and stylized facts of the
OSS community presented in Section 2. Formally,
Proposition 2. Ceteris paribus an individual with a
i) higher gain from the software, zi
ii) larger gift beneﬁt, gi
iii) longer time horizon, Ti (younger)
iv) lower discount rate, ri (more patient)
v) lower cost of software development, ci
or
vi) higher value of play, pi
is more likely to provide the OSS.
Proposition 2 follows from proposition 1, lemma 3 and the derivatives of
15¯ ti.13 Comparing proposition 2 to the results of Section 2, we ﬁnd that the
characterisation of OSS programmers derived from a mildly adapted private-
provision-of-a-public-good model matches surprisingly well with the popular
accounts of the typical OSS programmer. By simply introducing the three
central motives (need for a particular software solution, gift culture, homo
ludens) into a private-provision-of-public-goods framework, we found that –
fully in line with the evidence available – provision of OSS will be swift, and
programmers will be young and eﬃcient (talented/well-educated/low cost),
have a high play value of performing the programming (homo ludens payoﬀ),
will beneﬁt from the software they are producing, and value the gift culture
surrounding OSS.
One of the puzzling aspects of OSS is that the privately provided public
good OSS – which in principle should suﬀer from under-provision, delay
or low quality – does exist and even pose a credible threat to commercial
software producers. This can be explained in economic terms without simply
appealing to diﬀering monetary rewards as required by explanations relying
on signaling, if one is prepared to open up for features which appear to play a
role in the economic decisions of real people or at least of OSS programmers,
but are commonly ignored in economic thinking. These features include the
impact of fun and play in economic activity and gift societies. In other words
one has to allow homo ludens to enter the playing ﬁeld of homo oeconomicus.
13The derivatives of ¯ ti are provided in appendix A (not intended for publication) at the
end of the manuscript.
165 Conclusion
This paper tries to shed some light on the puzzling evidence that even though
OSS is a privately provided public good, and accordingly should suﬀer from
under-provision or low quality, it evolves quite to the contrary at a rapid
pace, developed for free by highly qualiﬁed, young and motivated individuals
and in fact poses a viable alternative to commercial software products. Based
on a review of the phenomenon of, and the motives behind, OSS, we adapt a
private-provision-of-public-goods model in the tradition of Bliss and Nalebuﬀ
(1984), Hendricks et al. (1988) and Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996) to address
this puzzle and to characterise those agents who ﬁnd it worthwhile to develop
OSS.
The paper departs from existing economic accounts of the OSS phenom-
ena by arguing that traditional signaling payoﬀs cannot satisfactorily explain
the involvement of hundreds of thousands of volunteer programmers in a ver-
itable ﬂood of humble and utterly invisible OSS projects and activities. In
particular we argue that signaling – although it can have a role in explaining
the involvement of programmers in mature and famous OSS projects – rarely
features among the motives of those who start up OSS projects. Instead we
rely on a set of predominantly intrinsic motives that have been discussed in
the wider OSS literature: (a) user programmers that actually need a particu-
lar software solution, (b) the fun of play or mastering the challenge of a given
software problem, i.e. homo ludens payoﬀ, and (c) the desire of belonging
to the gift society of active OSS programmers. In particular the latter two
motives, though widely acknowledged in social the sciences in general, are
often ignored in economics, yet carry important insights for the case at hand.
Our paper incorporates these three motives into a simple dynamic private-
provision-of-public-goods model. Given this set-up, the privately provided
17public good OSS becomes less of a puzzle. We are able to characterise the
contributing individual and to determine the time of provision, generating
results that compare well with empirical accounts of the OSS phenomenon.
In contrast to the standard models of the private provision of public goods
(e.g. Bliss and Nalebuﬀ (1984) or Alesina and Drazen (1991)), but in line
with results of Hendricks et al. (1988) and Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996),
this model features no delay. Open source software is provided at ‘maximum’
speed. The individual who will actually provide the OSS is characterised as
follows. Ceteris paribus the provider extracts a higher gain from using the
software, obtains a larger gift beneﬁt, has a longer time horizon (i.e. is a
younger individual), has lower costs of development, and is equipped with a
high value from play.
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22NOT FOR PUBLICATION
A Appendix: Proposition 2 – derivatives of ¯ ti
Two useful inequalities: Lemma 1 and equation (1) and (2) combined to
the inequality ui + gi + ri(pi − ci) > vi for members of the community n.
Subtracting vi on both sides gives:
zi + gi + ri(pi − ci) > 0 ∀ i ∈ [1,n] (A.1)
Also recall the war of attrition assumption from Section 3, namely:
ci − pi >
gi
ri
∀ i ∈ [1,n] (A.2)
Own value of OSS and gift beneﬁt: The derivatives of (6) with
























(zi + gi)(zi + gi + ri(pi − ci))
(A.4)






Programming cost and homo ludens payoﬀ: The derivatives of (6)









zi + gi + ri(pi − ci)
(A.5)
By (A.1) the denominator in (A.5) is positive. Hence,
∂¯ ti
∂ci < 0 and
∂¯ ti
∂pi > 0.













Which is the sum of a negative and a positive term. We want to show that
∂¯ ti

























zi+gi+ri(pi−ci). By (A.1) and (A.2 ) we have a > 1. Inequality
(A.8) can now be stated as:
a − log(a) > 1 (A.9)




B Why is OSS a public good?
A crucial prerequisite for our examination of the OSS phenomenon is the
assumption that such software is indeed a public good. A closer look at the
requirements for its classiﬁcation as a public good shows that the license
terms make the diﬀerence between open source and commercial proprietary
software. Due to the fact that software is an immaterial good, the use of the
program code by one individual does not aﬀect its use by another individual.
Therefore software is non-rival in its consumption (Houghton (1992, p.5);
Quintas (1994)). Thus, the ﬁrst characteristic of a public good is fulﬁlled
by all software programs (Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980)). As to the second
characteristic – non-excludability – it is important to note that development
of OSS goes back to the late seventies, when the free exchange of software
source codes was common (Stallman (1999)). Only with the emergence of
proprietary software at the beginning of the eighties have commercial enter-
prises started to exclude users from the use of their software via copyright
licenses and by distribution of compiled software, etc. Since then, the pub-
lic good character of some software programs has become a distinguishing
feature. It is obvious that those programmers who wanted their software to
remain open to anyone interested and who wanted to prevent a commercial
‘hijacking’ of the software had to make sure that their software remained
non-excludable. As a reaction to this challenge the Free Software Founda-
tion (FSF) was founded to guarantee the free access to the software of this
group by developing corresponding licenses. Diﬀerent licenses, e.g. GNU
GPL, GNU LGPL14, were introduced which ensure that the source code of
software can be copied, modiﬁed, distributed freely and – most importantly
– that all further developments fall under the same open source license (FSF
(2004)). Taking the non-rivalry of software together with the FSF software
licenses, which guarantee non-excludability, OSS qualiﬁes as a public good.
14GNU is a recursive acronym for ‘GNU’s not Unix’, further, GNU General Public
License (GNU GPL), GNU Lesser General Public License (GNU LGPL).
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